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Julian Posada & Leslie Regan Shade  
 
 
This paper provides an analysis of the discursive contradictions and narratives of labour within 
Hyr, a location-based freelance platform app that caters to the retail, hospitality, and restaurant 
sectors in Toronto and New York. The app provides companies with access to individuals with a 
variety of skills in these sectors and provides workers with access to contract jobs. The paper 
provides an analysis of Hyr’s promotional marketing, that targets urban “millennials,” and 
discusses how the platform exerts algorithmic and information control over its workers through 
their legal documentation and conditions of work within the platform. Situated within the “gig 
economy,” the paper also reviews current local policy proposals to alleviate the situation of gig 
workers in the Canadian context.  
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any individuals searching for jobs discover that digital platforms provide an alternative 
to traditional employment opportunities because they offer more job flexibility 
alongside a lower entry cost. These platforms portray themselves as software solutions 
for self-employed individuals who wish to have access to potential clients. However, these 
“matchmakers” not only serve as intermediaries between both parties, on top of their economic 
incentive, since they also regulate — and control — the workers’ behaviour through algorithms 
and information asymmetries (Rosenblat and Stark 2016).  
 
Platforms are hybrid organizations that combine the characteristics of firms and markets (Casilli 
and Posada 2019) and coordinate user exchanges through the aid of technological infrastructures, 
such as mobile apps and websites (Nieborg and Poell 2018). The dual nature of platforms, as 
firms and markets, means that, on the one hand, they present clear hierarchies, business models, 
and managerial strategies; for instance, by devising algorithms that serve as managerial control 
over the workers (Rosenblat and Stark 2016). On the other hand, they coordinate market 
exchanges and regulate their internal prices. A known example is the surge price algorithm that 
regulates the fares of ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Lyft (Rosenblat 2018). 
 
The platform economy is the latest development of an ongoing transformation in labour relations 
and the nature of capitalist markets. These trends reflect the enduring influence of the 
Californian ideology in the technology sector and beyond. Dubbed by Richard Barbrook and 
Andy Cameron during the early commercialization of the internet, “the California Ideology,” 
describes “a mix of cybernetics, free-market economics, and counter-culture libertarianism” 
(1996). These transformations can be traced to the shifting of economic paradigms away from 
post-war Keynesianism to a more deregulated form of flexible accumulation economics (Harvey 
1990). Primarily, these transformations led some national governments to follow austerity 
measures, the privatization of national enterprises, and the deregulation of their economies (Hall 
2011). 
 
These transformations affected the nature of firms and markets that constitute the core of 
contemporary digital platforms. As a coordination mechanism, markets have become more 
complex because of free trade, globalization, and the intermediation of technological 
infrastructures that are detached from human agency (Guyer 2016, p. 320). These characteristics 
provide contemporary digital platforms with multi-sided capacities that allow them to coordinate 
market exchanges between different users (Nieborg and Poell 2018). 
 
Firms have transformed into this complex and globalized market. They increasingly shifted from 
a retain-and-invest model, where their assets were re-invested in their operations, to a downsize-
and-distribute model based on lean management strategies focused on delivering value and 
optimizing work processes—usually through outsourcing labour and reducing production costs 
(Segrestin and Hatchuel 2012; Casilli 2019). 
 
From the worker perspective, platforms employ a workforce comprised of self-employed 
individuals—or just “users”—without considering them directly as workers (Prassl 2018, p. 
208). This outsourcing is placed within a general trend of neo-liberalism where the state and the 
firm, which after the Second Industrial Revolution had provided a safety net for the worker, 
chose to reduce or eliminate welfare services (Szeman 2015). Contemporary discourses of 
M 
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entrepreneurship thrive on promises of “flexibility” and “autonomy” but mask a situation in 
which workers have to bear the financial risks of self-employment, without the potential of 
creating wealth in the same way as traditional capitalist entrepreneurs (Cohen 2016b, p. 323). 
 
In this context, while these platforms thrive under the assumption that technological “disruption” 
equates innovation, their approach to work (as flexible, deregulated, and individualized) 
significantly affects those in vulnerable social and economic positions. This paper focuses on 
how the Canadian labour platform Hyr uses a shifting discourse to target young individuals who 
seek supplementary income. Instead of concentrating on other forms of platform control, such as 
algorithms and interfaces, this paper posits that the shifting discourse of platforms plays an 
essential role in the unequal power relationships between them and their users. More specifically, 
in the case of a platform that targets youth specifically, the article highlights how vulnerable 
populations, in this case, new entrants to the labour market with high financial instability, are the 
main focus of their marketing activities.  
 
As a labour platform, Hyr is situated at the end of this decades-long economic, social, and 
political development and transformation. While larger social media platforms like Facebook and 
Amazon have the power to permeate several aspects of user’s everyday life (van Dijck, Poell, 
and Wall 2018, p. 240), smaller ones like Hyr, with their hybrid organizational nature and their 
ownership of the technological infrastructure that mediates their operation, can still exert a 
significant influence over their workers. 
 
Hyr was founded in Toronto in 2015, and presents itself as “the labour marketplace for today’s 
new economy,”1 specializing in the retail, hospitality, and restaurant sectors. It provides 
companies with access to individuals with a variety of skills ranging from managerial assistants 
and security personnel to cooks and bartenders. This paper presents an analysis of the discursive 
contradictions of this particular labour platform. After first defining the characteristics of labour 
platforms and situating Hyr within the retail and hospitality sector, the paper then presents the 
narratives of labour embedded within the platform, providing an analysis of its contradictions in 
terms of both promotional marketing and algorithmic and information control. It also compares 
this outward discourse with their legal documentation that provides a radically different and 
more inward definition of labour and the conditions of work within the platform. The paper also 
discusses current local policy proposals to alleviate the situation of gig workers in the Canadian 
context. 
 
Hyr in the Platform Economy 
 
“The gig economy was looking for the ‘Uber’ of the labor market and Hyr was the answer” 
(Erika Mozes, co-founder of Hyr, quoted in Greenwood 2018). 
 
The Aspen Institute, a Washington D.C.-based educational and policy studies organization, 
defines gig or independent work as “income-earning activities outside of traditional, long-term 
employer-employee relationships” (Aspen Institute 2019) which is dependent on the working 
relationship between the contractor and the company or individual that pays them  – whether this 
work is temporary, project-based, or task-based. There are many forms of non-standard work 
                                                      
1 Quote from the platform’s social media website 
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arrangements, including freelancing, working through a temp agency, independent work, and 
subcontracted work.  Standard work relationships involve a relationship between the employer 
and employee, consisting of wage or salary payments, typically on an hourly or yearly basis.  
 
In the U.S. economy, the Aspen Institute notes that gig economy workers comprise more than 1 
in 4 for primary or supplementary work in any capacity, 1 in 10 for primary independent work, 
and less than 1% for work through online platforms such as Uber, Lyft and TaskRabbit (ibid). It 
is difficult to break down the demographic composition of gig workers by race, gender, age, 
educational level and geographic location, although a generalization can be forwarded that gig 
workers are younger, urban dwellers (ibid).  
 
On their website, Hyr boldly declares, “Welcome to the new labour economy,” which they 
describe as a gig economy that mutually benefits both workers and employers, “outside of the 9 
to 5 continuum,” enabled by their platform that “gives them choice and power in the labour 
market.” For businesses, particularly those in the restaurant and hospitality industry Hyr markets 
to, they promise to connect them “with great, accountable workers, fast, at the best possible 
price. So, they can fill any shift. At any time.” For Hyr’s workers (dubbed “pros”), the promise is 
that their “fully mobile platform allows talented, driven workers an option to choose their hours 
and pick up shifts in a pinch.”  Hyr promotes their services to the  “Bucket List Generation,” who 
they characterize as a restless “younger generation, who value time over money. And value 
experiences over things”  (Hyr, About Us: https://hyr.work/about-us/). 
 
Hyr was co-founded by entrepreneurs Erika Mozes and Joshua Karam in 2015, and their app 
launched in 2017. As of 2018 Hyr reported their company included 215 employers and 10,000 
contractors (Toronto Life 2018), with the goal to team with “recognizable brands, such as The 
Thompson Hotel, Bisha, Canadian Tire, Hemingway’s and Carbon Bar” (Joutsi 2019). Hyr is 
used in major cities in the U.S. (New York City, Miami, Los Angeles, Boston, and Chicago) and 
in Canada, Toronto and other markets. To date Hyr has raised a total of $2.4M USD in venture 
capital from Gaingels (a network of angel LGBT/Ally investors), XFactor Ventures (whose goal 
is to support female founders), Flybridge Capital Partners, and Newark Venture Partners 
(Toronto Life 2018).   
 
While Hyr’s workers earn “just shy of $20 an hour, on average,” according to Karam (Eisenberg 
2019), the company retains 19-30% of the salary and offsets this via a point system, called 
UPoints, that counts towards vacation days, health or dental insurance, or retirement savings. 
Mozes calls this feature a “worker first platform,” arguing that, “if the platforms were not worker 
focused there could be a future state where workers are no longer employed in more permanent 
employment and all work is done ad-hoc thereby eliminating the securities they get with a 
traditional employer/employee relationship” (Warner 2019). 
 
Mozes’ positioning of the worker reflects neo-liberal feminism, which subscribes to the logic of 
the marketplace and presumes individualization and responsibilization, an assumption embedded 
in the marketing strategies of “sharing economy” companies  (Shade 2018). This discourse touts 
the empowering benefits of labour flexibility and entrepreneurialism for women, alongside the 
“liberating” ability to pick up a gig while juggling family responsibilities and contributing to the 
family income. This is reflected in Mozes’ declaration that, “I have built a brand where our 
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workers like to share their success stories,” and her account of a woman who “picked up one 
week of shifts at Hero Certified Burgers before the holidays because she couldn’t afford to buy 
her daughter the gift she wanted. At the end of the week, she not only was able to afford to buy 
the holiday gift for her daughter, she was also offered a full-time job” (Joutsi 2019). 
 
Platform Typologies 
The ecosystems of labour platforms transcend local and national boundaries, which in many 
cases renders difficult their regulation, thus hindering effective policy action. There are several 
typologies of platforms that help us to understand their geographical reach, types of labour and 
services, and forms of operation (Casilli 2019; Schmidt 2017; Scholz 2012; Srnicek 2016). These 
typologies recognize that digital labour platforms, such as Uber or Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk), are a subset of a larger ecosystem that includes critical players of the technology sector 
such as the dominant firms Facebook, Google, and Amazon (the owner of MTurk). 
 
The typologies distinguish platforms according to two variables: their geographical boundaries 
and the specialization of their tasks. For example, in terms of geography, platforms that focus on 
delivery, ride-hauling, agricultural, or housekeeping connect clients with workers that perform 
jobs in a particular location, like a house, a city, or a territory. However, in freelancing and 
“micro-work” platforms, the worker can operate remotely from a computer or mobile in any part 
of the world, with much of this labour centred in low-income countries, which Nick Dyer-
Witheford characterizes as “the new frontier of cybernetic piece work” (2015, p. 122). 
 
The second distinction relevant for policy is the fragmentation of tasks, since some jobs can be 
broken up and performed by a multitude of users (mostly in the case of algorithmic training). In 
the case of geographically bound labour, for instance, a single worker conducts tasks like 
delivery services, while location-based crowdsourcing fragment the tasks to hundreds or 
thousands of users. In the case of work performed on desktop computers, while freelancers often 
perform skilled jobs (Cohen 2016a), “micro-workers” perform small unskilled tasks such as data 
labelling, content moderation, or algorithmic training (hence their categorization) (Wood et al. 
2018).  
 
Following these two distinctions, Hyr can be defined as a location-based freelance platform. On 
the one hand, workers provide services that require training, experience, and even certification. 
Additionally, they serve on single shifts that can last for multiple hours, sometimes repeating 
over several days. On the other hand, their jobs depend on particular locations within the cities of 
operation of Hyr across Canada and the United States. These locations can include restaurants, 
hotels, boutiques or other venues needing catering or hospitality services. 
 
The Platform 
In this section, we first describe the main characteristics of Hyr’s website and application, 
including its design and content. Then, we describe the general user experience in terms of 
account creation for both workers and labour requesters. Finally, we describe the contradictions 
in terms of user experience and legal documentation. By correlating the data collected from 
studying the platform and the publicly available terms and conditions, we describe the platform’s 
contradictions in the treatment of workers and how the legal documents describe forms of 
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managerial control that place Hyr far from their purported software solution for businesses and 
entrepreneurs.  
 
This analysis elucidates that the marketing discourses of the platform target young individuals 
primarily, from their representation in advertisements to the use of language and content that 
allude to this particular demographic. Regarding the differences between the platform’s 
discourse towards its workers and clients, examination of the content of their website and 
application (FAQ pages, blogs, and legal documentation), usually divided between these two 
groups, highlight dissimilarities in communicative styles. While Hyr focuses on treating their 
workers as entrepreneurs who need software to match them with potential clients, the discourse 
towards the requesters of labour represents the workers as young workers in need of special 
managerial provisions. Several managerial mechanisms are embedded within the platform, 
including the introduction of the points systems to keep workers using the platform, and 
managerial provisions highlighted in the legal documentation, such as prohibiting workers from 
engaging in long-term professional relationships with the requesters. 
 
Design and Marketing 
The platform’s website is built mostly to direct users towards the mobile application, which is 
their primary communication channel. The website, as well as the app, are designed with bright 
colours, based on a vivid fuchsia. Text is kept at a minimum, while each of the pages presents a 
background photograph of a young adult, from different genders and ethnic backgrounds. Some 
of them wear casual clothing, of bright or pastel colours, while others wear aprons or other 
professional attire from the hospitality sector. All of them are smiling, in a relaxed position, 
looking directly at the camera. 
 
While further research is needed in order to study the demographics of Hyr’s workers, public 
information available on the workers’ profiles indicate that a significant number of its workers 
are youth. Indeed, Hyr’s website features images of attractive, multicultural hipsters (adorned in 
tattoos, beanies and plaid shirts).   Their Instagram feed is a checkerboard of images of young 
people, with the slogan: “Fill any shift. At any time.”  In distinct square images, photos depict 
satisfied and smiling young adults. Through these images and slogans Hyr boasts that by 
“Promoting their brand to living your dream,” they create the financial means for young adults to 
pursue leisure activities (“Coat check to Coachella,” “BA shifts to LGA flights,” “Side hustle to 
main stage,” “Dance like everybody’s watching,” “Bar tending to bar hopping”).  
 
Frequently Asked Questions 
The “frequently asked questions”, or FAQ page, is divided into two sections, one for the 
workers, who are called “Pros” by the platform, and another section for those who requested 
their labour, named “Companies.” Both are named “Professionals” and “Requesters” 
respectively in the legal documentation, only available through the app after the account 
creation. The workers’ FAQ page serves as a very brief training on the major elements of the use 
of the platform: payment (including tips), rating system, job training, points system, 
notifications, and a question about the platform complying with labour laws (to which the answer 
is “absolutely”). 
 
The “Requester” FAQ section is more detailed but also misleading in some aspects. While 
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questions about the nature of workers are defined better, as they specify that they be “classified 
as independent 10992 contractors,” other pieces of information are less straightforward. For 
instance, related to the question about whether workers of the platform are screened previously 
(as would typically be the case for an outsourcing firm), the platform answers by describing their 
service without actually saying (as is stated in the Terms and Conditions) that neither the 
workers not the requesters are screened beforehand. 
 
Media and Blog 
The media section of the website presents several newspaper articles and press releases that 
mention Hyr. While the press releases focus on the announcements of new partnerships of the 
platform with companies that provide software for restaurant management and catering services, 
the newspaper articles are generally about the “gig economy.” These articles are surprisingly not 
always in favour of the gig economy, but they all position the platform and Hyr in a positive 
manner, thus differentiating them from significant players in the labour platform market such as 
Uber, which has received abundant media attention for their ambitious challenge to the taxi 
industry and their aggressive business culture (Rosenblat 2018). 
 
The blog section, with original content published or provided by the platform, is primarily 
destined for the requesters. While these short posts never explicitly mention the platform, 
focusing instead on general managerial and gig economy topics, they can be read as advice for 
corporate users of the platforms. These posts are generally about four topics: instructions on how 
to hire gig workers, how to manage young adults (called “Millennials”), managerial issues in 
dealing with temporary—or “gig”—workers, and ways in which the gig economy can benefit 
businesses. 
 
Here, instead of continuing a discourse that refers to the workers as “professionals” and 
“businesses,” as is the case in the legal documentation, the company treats them as mere workers 
in need of managerial oversight. Moreover, the blog posts give many examples of how the 
platform economy benefits businesses that choose to outsource their workers. The posts highlight 
how companies can save costs by hiring “temporary workers without the financial pressure of 
onboarding them, providing benefits and insurance or payroll taxes,” while having “highly 
skilled” individuals that can fill up any shift at any given time. 
 
Finally, many of the posts are about the selection of workers. Typically, outsourcing companies 
recruit their staff in advance, but the platform does not perform this duty. Instead, they place 
these tasks onto the requester. They make this explicitly clear in the contracts where they 
announce that neither the requester nor the workers are screened at all by the platform and that it 
is their responsibility—and risk—to know to whom they are working with. This is a constant 
trend in digital labour platforms where the users at the other ends of the multi-sided market (in 
this case the requesters) also perform “inconspicuous” labour that otherwise should be the 
responsibility of the firm in a non-platform environment (Tubaro et al. 2018). 
                                                      
2 A United States tax form for independent contractors. 
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The “Hiring” Process 
Most of the interactions between the workers and the platform occur in the mobile application. 
To sign in, workers need to submit their telephone number, email address, and full name. New 
profiles will automatically obtain fifty points for the reward system, and workers then have to 
proceed to fill them with other personal information: work experience in the hospitality and 
restaurant sector, skills, and a photograph. 
 
The available shifts depend on the skills and location of the worker. The “End User Licence 
Agreement” advises users of the application to maintain their geolocation enabled at all times. 
The shifts’ information shows the name of the requester, the wage (before taxes), how many 
“UPoints” are earned after the shift, the address, time, and any further comments. Their rate by 
workers (based on a five-point scale) and the number of reviews is also shown. 
 
Some platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (in the past), only allowed “requesters”, and 
not the workers, to rate (Irani & Silberman 2013), while others like Uber allow both types of user 
to rate each other (Rosenblat 2018). Nevertheless, even though Hyr presents information on the 
rate and number of reviews, there is no qualitative assessment on the worker experience 
available on the application. Moreover, the job descriptions are varied, but they usually explain 
what is generally required of the worker, inform about any specific requests (for instance, the 
uniform), and detail whether obtaining tips is possible. 
 
The “UPoint” scheme lies at the core of the gamification system of the Hyr platform. 
Gamification is a managerial tool in which game systems are used in a non-gaming environment 
as a mechanism of control (Woodcock and Johnson 2017). This loyalty scheme consists of a 
collection of points obtained after each completed shift. They are calculated from the payment of 
the worker at a ratio of two points per dollar earned. Workers can redeem 2,500 points for $75, 
or what the platform calls “a paid UDay.” Thus, for this to happen, the worker has to earn $1,250 
before cashing the “paid UDay,” which represents 6% of the total earned. 
 
According to an interview with one of the co-founders of the Hyr platform, Karam, the average 
wage of the workers is $20 (Eisenberg 2019), which means that they would have to work 62 
hours to get the “free paid day.” Karam claims that workers can choose “where to allocate their 
points — accruing them for paid time off, health or dental insurance or retirement savings” 
(ibid.) Nevertheless, even though the interview is recent, there is no mention of this possibility in 
any of the website or platform documentation. 
 
The Hyr point system does not improve the working conditions of the platform users. Instead of 
being a way to empower them into allocating their “points” towards services that they need—and 
would have the right to under an employment relationship—the point system is a gamification 
strategy that primarily serves a managerial purpose. Work in the hospitality sector is prone to 
mobilities (Ghazali 2005), and the platform would need to maintain its workers using the 
platform without, at the same time, creating strong social ties with the requesters, since they 
would stop using the platform and establish direct contact with the workers. The Hyr platform 
provides several provisions against this in their contracts and policies; these are explored in the 
following section. 
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From Service to Management 
The status of workers within the Hyr platform is contradictory as it changes depending on whom 
the platform addresses. On the one hand, they present blog posts to requesters about how to 
manage millennial workers, referring to them explicitly as “gig workers.” The platform also uses 
language related to labour activities to their “professionals”: they talk about “working shifts,” 
free “paying UDays,” and reassure their compliance with “labour and employment laws.” 
 
On the other hand, the many legal documents available for consultation, including the 
agreements, licenses, and the privacy policy, explicitly state that none of the users of the 
platforms are contractual workers. In the agreement with the “pros,” they are instead called 
“independent professionals” and, following a discourse closer to the general one of the “gig 
economy,” as entrepreneurs: 
 
By agreeing to this agreement, you are asserting that you are an independent professional 
and entrepreneur who wishes to: (a) digitize and modernize your business; (b) be 
introduced to potential new clients by Hyr; and (c) engage Hyr for its service to accomplish 
these entrepreneurial goals (Hyr, Agreement Between Professional & Hyr, p. 1). 
 
The legal documentation makes a concerted effort to affirm the self-employed status of workers 
and treats them as “businesses” on their own. In this context, instead of being an outsourcing 
company, the platform presents itself as merely a software service provider. Furthermore, they 
state that they do not screen any users that use the service, warning of the potential risks of using 
it: 
 
Hyr is not responsible or liable for the actions or inactions of a Requester or other third 
party in relation to Projects as completed by you. You understand, therefore, that by using 
the service, you will be introduced to third parties for whom Hyr has not conducted any 
background check, that may be potentially dangerous, and that you use the service at your 
own risk (Hyr, Agreement Between Professional & Hyr,  p. 4). 
 
However, even though the Hyr platform tries to place all the risk with the workers, their legal 
documentation shows other forms of control towards the workers on top of the gamification 
system discussed previously. 
 
Several provisions of the legal documentation state explicitly that the Hyr platform is against the 
development of an employment relationship between the requester and the workers. The 
platform states that “any interactions or disputes between [the worker] and a Requester are solely 
between [their worker] and that Requester” (Hyr, Agreement Between Requester & Hyr, p. 3). 
However, the platform also emphasizes in the agreement for requesters that they must “agree and 
acknowledge that [the requester] will engage the Professionals as independent contractors. 
Nothing contained herein shall be deemed or construed to create an employment relationship, 
partnership or joint venture between [the requester] and the Professionals” (ibid.). 
 
Thus, despite the platform’s willingness to place most of the risks onto the users, they also take 
precautions so they will not create any long-term relationships that could endanger their business 
models, either legally (through labour laws) or economically (through the loss of fidelity). Hyr’s 
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legal documentation, notably the service agreement and the privacy policy, affirms that the 
platform controls all of the electronic communications between the requester and the worker: 
 
You agree to Hyr’s use of a service provider to mask your phone number when you 
exchange text messages and phone calls with Professionals. Hyr and its service provider 
will store your messaging and call data (including the time and date of the call or message, 
each of your phone numbers and the content of any text messages). You consent to this 
process and Hyr’s use and disclosure of this data for its business purposes (Hyr, Agreement 
Between Professional & Hyr; Hyr, Agreement Between Requester & Hyr). 
 
Hyr’s platform, therefore, reserves the right to control the flow of online information between the 
different ends of its market. Since it cannot—and wishes not to—control the interactions 
between them at the workplace, the platform deploys other mechanisms to protect its interests 
while keeping the same business model based on precarious “micro-entrepreneurs.” 
 
Finally, the privacy document of the Hyr platform raises questions concerning the ownership of 
the data created by the workers. According to the document, all the data that does not constitute 
“personal data” becomes the property of the firm automatically. Their definition of what 
constitutes personal information is the following: 
 
 “Personal Information” means information about an identifiable individual, including any 
information that alone or when in combination with other information may be used to 
readily identify, contact, or locate you, such as: name, address, email address, or phone 
number. We do not consider Personal Information to include information that has been 
anonymized so that it does not allow a third party to identify a specific individual (Hyr, 
Privacy Policy, p. 1). 
 
This information suggests that any content, conversation, location data, or media file that does 
not fall into the definition becomes the aggregate property of the platform and can be used to 
their economic and legal gain. 
 
Moreover, the Hyr platform places little responsibility on the correct storage, as it does with any 
other aspect of its relationship with the workers: 
 
We take steps to ensure that your information is treated securely and in accordance with 
this Privacy Policy. Unfortunately, the Internet cannot be guaranteed to be 100% secure, 
and we cannot ensure or warrant the security of any information you provide to us. We do 
not accept liability for unintentional disclosure. Your information will be kept as long as is 
necessary to facilitate the service or as required by law (Hyr, Privacy Policy). 
 
In this section, we described the contradictions in the discourse of Hyr. In the case of their 
marketing, the platform hides any explicit mention of the labour relationship with the workers. 
Instead, for them, the platform’s discourse focuses on the coolness of casual work and the 
easiness in accessing their services, preferring to portray their workers as independent 
freelancers.  However, the platform’s discourse changes for those wishing to hire casual workers 
and in their “terms and conditions.” For labour requesters, the platform provides management 
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tools and tips, encouraging them to hire gig workers while advising on how to counter the 
downsides of casual jobs. Moreover, in their legal documentation, the platform discloses 
managerial practices that include the control of the users’ information flows and communication, 
as well as other gamification tools to exert control on the workers.  
 
In the following section, we situate the case of Hyr within the general context of the “gig 
economy,” notably in the Canadian context, and the implication of the platform's discursive 
contradiction for their workers.   
 
Hyr within the Gig Economy 
The legal classification and tax status for independent, gig workers, and platform-based labour is 
considered to be a non-standard work arrangement. This work is characterized by its precarity, 
which the Ontario (Canada) Ministry of Labour defines as work that makes it difficult to earn a 
“decent income,” does not provide “decent working conditions,” and can put workers “at risk in 
material ways” (Mitchell and Murray 2017, p. 14).  A U.S. survey by MBO Partners, the 
Freelancers’ Union and McKinsey Global Institute indicated than an estimated 25-30% of 
workers were engaged in some form of independent work on a “supplementary or primary basis 
in the preceding month” (Aspen Institute, How Many Workers?). 
 
A Pool of Young Workers 
In Canada, Statistics Canada (2017) estimates that 9.5% of people aged 18 or over participated in 
the on-demand economy between November 2015 and October 2016. In a survey of 2,304 
residents in the Greater Toronto area, Sheila Block and Trish Hennessey of the Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives (2017) revealed that 9% work in this sector while 38% have availed 
themselves of services. These services include car/ride services (25%), cleaning services (27%), 
home-cooked meals (21%), food delivery (19%), carpooling (19%), and home rentals such as 
Airbnb (17%). Their survey revealed that workers in this sector are young (71% under the age of 
45, with 32% aged 18-29 and 39% 30-44), and educated (90% state they have attended college or 
university).  In terms of gender, 51% are men, 48% women, and 1% transgendered; and 54% are 
racialized and 46% non-racialized.  Half of the survey workers had children, with 48% engaged 
in this type of work for over one year. The annual salary for workers was under $80,000 CDN 
per year, with gig work accounting for 58% of their personal income. Just over 40% stated that 
the work does not provide as much income as they need. Worker respondents said they engaged 
in on-demand work to make extra money (64%), because it was the only available employment 
alternative for them (55%), with 53% stating that they would do it until better work came around. 
Stated downsides of this work included not being able to make enough money (41%), dealing 
with customer disputes (38%), inability to secure enough work (37%), lack of sick pay (35%) 
unpredictable hours (34%), and difficulties with always being “on call” (20%). 
 
Block and Hennessey state that the predominance of young workers in the on-demand service 
economy reflect general labour trends in the Toronto area, where for millennials, “full-time 
secure jobs aren’t as readily available so the on-demand service economy is becoming one of the 
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Insecurity is an endemic element of gig labour.  In a literature review about on-demand labour, 
Uttam Bajwa, Lilian Knorr, Erica Di Ruggiero, Denise Gastaldo, and Adam Zendel at the 
University of Toronto (2018) assessed and identified three vulnerabilities for gig labour. These 
include: 1) precarity related to the short-term nature of the work (lack of healthcare benefits or 
insurance, lack of standardized labour protections, need to provide own tools/supplies); 2) 
platform-based characteristics (ratings and reputational economy of app design, surveillance 
built into the app, worker misclassification, fluctuating terms of governance between the 
app/company and the worker); and 3) occupational (health risks). Young people (millennials) are 
over-represented in the gig economy, and the authors note that media discourse has “helped to 
perpetuate the idea that gig workers are young, educated, hip millennials” (Bajwa et al. 2018, p. 
6).  
 
The youthful promotional branding of Hyr is reinforced in a hyper-local urban website which 
characterizes young Torontonians as desperate for gigs to finance their lifestyle: “From picking 
up extra serving shifts to selling clothes on the weekend, millennials will do just about anything 
to make those extra dollars. For Toronto’s millennial workforce, ‘side hustle’ gigs are a normal 
way of gaining a little extra pocket cash to fund the big city lifestyle, which in Toronto counts as 
rent” (Smith 2018). 
 
The example of Hyr, among many other location-based gig economy platforms, raises questions 
about the role of the platform in the social reproduction of workers. As Creig Lamb and Sarah 
Doyle of the Toronto-based Brookfield Institute for Innovation & Entrepreneurship note, the 
popularity of micro-tasking is experienced differently by young adults depending on their 
personal financial and family means. Even though it is too early to conclude that Hyr’s workers 
receive some or most of their income from the service, its advertising targets specifically young 
individuals who need to complement their income through casual work. Further research will 
need to elucidate the role of personal networks and settings in producing the social and economic 
environment necessary for youths to engage in casual work through apps like Hyr and many 
other location-based gig economy platforms. 
  
Referring specifically to Hyr, Lamb and Doyle note that the digital marketplace “is enabling 
people to build careers based on short term engagements, while creating more efficient matches 
between labour supply and market and employer demand” (2017, p. 10). They quote from the 
Government of Canada’s 2016 Expert Panel on Youth Unemployment, which describes some 
youth as “thriving” in the gig economy: “excited about forging their own path, these youth have 
the support they need from friends or family to help them to manage any associated risk” (ibid, 
p. 10). This situation creates the condition that, for many youths, the gig economy is the “new 
normal,” especially when “anecdotal evidence suggests that a growing number of Canadian 
youths are choosing to freelance” (ibid, p. 10). While the extent to which these “friends” or 
“family”—or other components of their social capital—participate in the platform’s value 
production requires further research, the situation of young gig workers hints that, instead of 
platforms placing the risks of micro-entrepreneurship solely on individuals (Szeman 2016), they 
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A Multi-sided Discourse 
Like many other platforms, Hyr takes advantage of its technological infrastructure to operate an 
internal market with multiple ends. As discussed previously, platforms are flexible organizations 
that profit from the detachment of markets from personal experience, adopting a “more dynamic 
(even opportunistic) approach” (Casilli and Posada 2019). As Nieborg and Powell put it, their 
multi-sided markets depend on network effects where one end of its market affects the others  
(2018, p. 4). For instance, the flow of users from one end influences similar entries or exits from 
the other. Another characteristic is the pricing structures where one end of the market, a “money 
side,” covers the costs of another “subsidy side” (Evans and Schmalensee 2016).  
 
Although the concept of market multi-sidedness is a purely economic term, its expansion to 
include social—and discursive—issues allows for a better understanding of Hyr’s contradictory 
portrayal of its labour services. As presented in the previous section, the platform shifts its 
discourse depending on which side of its market it addresses. On the one hand, workers confront 
a “cool” portrayal of casual work, and the platform treats them as “brands” or 
“entrepreneurs.” On the other hand, for the requesters, they are described as casual “millennial” 
workers in need of unique managerial strategies and incentives to keep them from leaving the 
platform and their temporary jobs.  
 
Our findings suggest that these contradictions are deliberate and part of the strategies of 
information control that the platform implements, together with the intermediation of 
communication channels, personal data, or user matchmaking. Much as how platforms 
intentionally manipulate their pricing structures and network effects to maximize profits, by 
subsidizing one end of its market with others or by increasing user exit costs, Hyr behaves 
accordingly from its discourse. In its efforts from circumventing the full extent of the social and 
economic ties with employment, even in the case of casual or part-time work, the platform 
changes its discourse enabled by the different communication channels and multiple users. 
 
Platform Governance and Policy 
In Toronto, the on-demand labour sector is extremely precarious, as workers are considered to be 
independent contractors without the perks of minimum wage and overtime protections as 
outlined in the Ontario Employment Standards Act (ESA) (Ontario 2000, 2019). The ESA sets 
minimum standards for most workplaces in the Province of Ontario and prohibits any employer 
from penalizing any employee in their exercise of their ESA rights. The ESA details employee 
rights which include clarity about their hours of work and meal breaks, their minimum and 
overtime pay, payday, vacation time and pay, public holidays, leaves of absence, and termination 
notice and pay.  In the case of Hyr, Hennessey, of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 
has asked, who is the employer: Hyr, the app or the business owner that uses Hyr? And, how is 
the business owner using the app to classify the worker: as an independent contractor to avoid 
labour laws? (Charles 2018). “By situating workers outside of their boundaries,” write Finn 
Makela, Derek McKee and Teresa Scassa, platform companies, despite their claims to 
innovation, externalize their labour costs (2018, pp. 10-11).  
 
Sunil Johal and Jordann Thirgood of the Mowat Centre3, an independent policy forum at the 
University of Toronto’s School of Public Policy & Governance, recommend a rethink of the 
                                                      
3 In April 2019 the Mowat Centre announced that it was forced to shut down because of provincial cuts to 
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design of labour and employment legislation in Canada to provide additional supports for 
independent workers who are vulnerable because of the lack of supports inherent in a standard 
employment relationship:   
 
Policymakers should explore whether independent contractors in the new gig economy merit 
additional protections that they have not traditionally been afforded. For example, provisions 
around minimum wage for Canadians working through sharing economy platforms would 
help provide a certain level of income security… Extending other partial or full employment 
protections and minimum requirements to gig workers who are ‘dependent contractors’ could 
go some ways towards preventing platforms from a classification race to the bottom. (Johal 
and Thirgood 2017, pp. 44-45) 
 
They further recommend creating “portable benefits” for gig economy workers that can be 
“transferable between gigs and require contributions from companies” while also “bolstering the 
protections and insurance options available to independent, gig workers” (ibid, p. 48).  This is 
similar to what Harry Arthurs recommends: the creation of a new legal category that provides the 
ability for sharing economy/gig workers to bargain collectively, be protected under labour 
standards legislation and various employment-based benefits packages and have access to the 
state’s social safety net (2018, p. 58). 
 
Nevertheless, the governance of platforms should also be taken into consideration (Gorwa 2019). 
Since the inequalities of the platform are a deliberate action from within their design, they have a 
political responsibility in the wellbeing of workers and policy action should reflect this. For 
instance, the lack of regulation in many of the newly emerged contexts of non-standard work 
leaves open many questions about worker rights and benefits. Investigating digitally mediated 
work, Phoebe Moore (2018) points out to the emerging forms of harassment and violence that 
workers face. She mentions that algorithmic management of reputation systems on digital 
platforms fuels stresses and creates risks in workload management, while digital surveillance of 
working practices may additionally introduce discrimination. Moreover, investigating work 
quality in the gig economy, Wood et al. (2018) find that while algorithmic management 
techniques tend to offer workers high levels of flexibility, autonomy, task variety and 
complexity, these mechanisms can also result in low pay, social isolation, working unsocial and 
irregular hours, overwork, sleep deprivation and exhaustion (p. 10). 
 
As we have described, Hyr’s platform changes its discourse depending on which end of its 
market it addresses for its gain, while trying to circumvent the social implications of traditional 
labour. Thus, on top of policy designed to update gig work into contemporary labour laws in 
order to provide more benefits for the workers, we argue that policy should also aim to check, 
advise, and verify platforms in terms of their structural design. From algorithms that manage 
their workers, to their shifting discourse to attract and retain users, these strategies are created 
deliberately by the platform. Instead of being neutral intermediaries, these platforms extract 
value from its users and use their malleability for their profit. For this reason, these organizations 
                                                                                                                                                                              
its funding from Ontario Conservative government. See Stephen Cook, “Mowat Centre think-tank to shut 





Democratic Communiqué, Vol. 29 [2020], Iss. 1, Art. 25
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/democratic-communique/vol29/iss1/25








Extolling the “side hustle” to millennials, Hyr’s promotional discourse illustrates Jim 
McGuigan’s concept of “cool” capitalism: “the incorporation of disaffection into capitalism 
itself” (McGuigan 2012, p. 431), which reflects “more a sign of compliance than of resistance” 
(ibid, p. 432), obscured by “dirty little secrets” (ibid) wherein the human costs are hidden and 
obscured. In our conclusion, we want to bring to the surface a “dirty little secret” of the gig 
economy that Hyr obscures: a fuzziness of the employee-employer relationship which can skirt 
labour law in various jurisdictions and thus shift the discourse of the platform depending on the 
user it addresses.  
 
Theoretically, we positioned Hyr as an example of the labour platform paradigm, within the 
contemporary phase of the evolution of capitalism. Instead of seeing platforms as software 
solutions or neutral intermediaries between the supply and demand of labour, this reading 
regards them as organizations with business strategies that manage internal markets. Moreover, 
we situate Hyr within its local gig economy market, dominated by middle-aged to young 
educated workers, with a high proportion of racialized individuals (based on Canadian gig work 
statistics), who seek flexible jobs as an essential primary or secondary source of income.  
 
By studying the discourse of the platform, notably by comparing it from the experience of 
multiple users, workers and requesters, we suggest that the economic definition of multi-
sidedness could also be expanded to include the communicative exchanges of platforms, on top 
of the usual service and monetary transactions. In the case of Hyr, the platform shifts its speech 
depending on which side of its market it addresses, notably by changing the connotation of 
words associated with contractual labour. In this way, the platform presents its services to its 
workers—and legal authorities—as a software application for entrepreneurs while introducing 
them to the requesters as casual millennial workers. At the same time, the platform chooses not 
to mention how it uses the communication networks and algorithms to manage these 
relationships between both ends of its market. 
 
In this paper we maintain that platforms have a political responsibility, in the sense of 
governance, towards their workers. Thus, any form of regulation should not only seek to 
empower workers by giving them representation and fair pay but also hold platforms accountable 
for their managerial practices, and ensure that their communication channels are transparent and 
unified to the many ends of their market, particularly those on the side of the supply and demand 
for labour. Moreover, another challenge of platform regulation is to address both workers who 
use platforms as a primary source of income and those who use them as casual work. Particularly 
in the case of younger users, a better understanding of the use of platforms as a secondary 
income source is needed since, in some cases, workers depend on their personal networks for 
social and economic safety—thus, suggesting that the platform’s value chains could extend 
beyond the user level. 
 
We therefore are in agreement with Anita Gurumurthy (2019) and her colleagues at IT for 
Change, who argue that the global intensification of platforms in shaping socio-economic 
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livelihoods and challenging jurisdictional frameworks demands platform governance that 
transcends mere technology policy issues, necessitating a “cohesive policy response that can 
adequately and appropriately reorient the platform mode of economic organization towards a 
more equitable distribution of the efficiencies of intelligence scale economies” (p.75). 
Highlighting that the precarity of gig labour and algorithmic control of workers is not yet 
accounted for in labour law (and in certain jurisdictions, highly contested), they declare that 
“worker rights will need a back-to-the-basics policy imagination” (p. 91). 
 
On a more general level, even though platform labour is a phenomenon developed in recent 
years, these organizations are part of a more significant trend in the transformation of labour and 
employment. The “disruption” of these companies that circumvent existing employment 
regulations behind the mask of “innovative” technology reverses the existing gains of labour 
movements in terms of the social security of workers. This paper thus provides a case study of 
one platform that targets vulnerable populations, in this instance, young individuals, for whom 
casual employment is an essential source of income. Hyr is characteristic of online 
intermediaries that are situated between the worker and the client/app, described by Ursula Huws 
as “‘logged labour’, with their work governed by algorithms, standardised, deprofessionalised” 
(Huws 2019, p. 162). In the end, the flexibility that these technology companies offer is a new 
iteration of the exploitation of workers that characterizes capitalism, and that thrives in cases 
where law and public policy fail to regulate them. 
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